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ABSTRACT 
Multinational firms that use domestic technologies in foreign  locations are required  to pay 
royalties  from foreign users to domestic  owners.  Foreign  governments  often tax these royalty 
payments.  High royalty  tax rates raise the cost of imported technologies.  This paper examines 
the effect of royalty  taxes  on the local  R&D  intensities  for foreign affiliates  of multinational 
corporations,  looking  both at  foreign-owned  affiliates in the United States and at  American-owned 
affiliates in  other countries.  The results indicate that higher royalty  taxes are associated with 
greater R&D  intensity  on the part of affiliates,  suggesting that local R&D is a substitute for 
imported technology. 
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and NBER 1.  Introduction. 
Many governments encourage  the development  and use of new technologies within the 
borders of  their countries. It is not difficult to understand why they do so.  It is widely believed that 
the positive correlation between local economic  affluence  and the presence of  technologically 
advaiced industries implies that the use of  new technologies enhances overall productivity.  More 
direct evidence generally supports the conclusion  that the economic benefits of research and 
development (R&D)  activity extend to local firms other than those undertaking the R&D.'  Since 
there are reasons to expect that externality-generating  R&D activites may be underprovided by 
markets in which  developers of  new technologies do not  capture all of the economic benefits that the 
technologies provide, various governments offer R&D-related tax subsidies.2  Governments that do 
not offer R&D  tax subsidies are often concerned that perhaps they should.  There are, however, many 
open questions about the impact of  tax policy on the level of R&D. 
Tax systems influence  the level and content of R&D activity through a variety of 
channels.  This paper focuses on R&D  by multinational  firms, and the impact of  one particular set of 
taxes: withholding  taxes on cross-border royalty payments. Firms that develop new technologies in 
their home countries and use the  technologies in foreign locations are required to pay royalties from 
foreign affiliates to domestic parent companies.  Governments tax  these royalty payments.  High tax 
See Griliches (1991) and Nadiri (1993) for surveys of  empirical measures of  productivity spillovers 
from  R&D activities. 
21n  theory, the  welfare consequences of subsidizing R&D  are ambiguous,  because competitive 
pressures might generate too much R&D  in certain industries in the absence of  a subsidy, and because 
foreign  competitors may benefit from domestic subsidies (or  in other ways influence the  domestic 
market).  See Dixit  (1988) and Reinganum (1989) for surveys of the theory.  The  United States 
introduced the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit, and increased the tax deductibility of  the R&D 
expenses  of  certain multinational corporations, in the Economic Recovery Tax  Act of 1981.  This 
legislation appears to have been motivated by consideration  of  economic externalities, though the focus 
of Congressional sentiment as described in U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation (1981) is on 
comparisons of U.S. research intensity with the research intensities of  other countries. 2 
rates make royalties, and the technotogy imports that they accompany, more expensive for the foreign 
affiliates that pay the taxes. 
to theory, higher costs of imported technology might encourage oc discourage local 
R&D by affiliates of  multinational corporations.  If local R&D is complementary with imported 
technology, then high royalty tax rates should discourage local R&D, while if  local R&D is a 
substitute for imported technology, then high royalty tax rates should encourage local R&D. 
This paper has two objectives.  The first is to identify the degree to which R&D 
activity by multinational  firms is sensitive to local tax conditions.  The second objective is to 
determine whether imported technology and local R&D  are complements or substitutes. 
The results suggest that R&D responds significantly to local tax rates, and that local 
R&D is a substitute for imported technology. These results appear both in the behavior of American 
investors in other countries, and in the behavior of foreign investors in the United States.  Firms 
appear to react to high royalty tax  rates by paying fewer royalties and performing additional R&D 
locatly.  To the extent that royalty payments reflect actual technology transfer (rather than adept 
accounting  practices), the behavior of multinational  firms implies that local R&D is a substitute for 
imported technology. 
Section 2 of the paper briefly describes the tax treatment of  multinational firms, 
paying particular attention to technology-related  issues.  Section 3 describes a simple model of firm 
behavior that traces the link between taxation and the degree of  complementarity or  substitutability of 
local R&D and imported technology.  Section 4 describes the data that serves as the basis of the 
empirical work.  Section 5 presents evidence on the relationship between royalty tax rates in foreign 
countries and the R&D intensities of  local affiliates of  American multinational firms.  Section 6 
examines the same relationship for foreign firms investing in the United States.  Section 7 is  the 
conclusion. 3 
2.  Multinational  Firms. Taxation, and International  Technolpay Transfer. 
This section examines the role of  multinational  firms in international technology 
transfer, and reviews the tax treatment of  R&D expenditures and royalty receipts by multinational 
firms. 
International  Technology Transfer 
There is considerable interest in understanding the role that multinational firms play in 
transferring technologies across borders.  There are two  methods by which multinational  firms 
provide new technologies to the countries in which they invest.  The first method is to develop new 
technologies locally, through R&D or other similar type of activity.  The second method is to import 
technologies produced elsewhere. 
The foreign affiliates of  American firms use both methods to bring technologies to the 
countries in which they operate, and there exists sufficient information to assess quantitatively the 
relative significance of each method.  Direct information  on the R&D activities  of the foreign 
affiliates of U.S.  firms is reported in surveys conducted by the United States Commerce Department. 
Information on technology imports by these affiliates  is considerably sketchier.  One can, however, 
infer  the approximate magnitude of technology imports from royalties paid by the affiliates to U.S. 
parent firms and third parties in other countries, since royalty payments should, in principle, reflect 
the values of imported technologies. 
Table 1  reports detailed information  about the aggregate technology-related behavior 
of the foreign affiliates of U.S.  firms in 1982 arid 1989.  It is noteworthy that  these affiliates paid 
more in royalties to their parent firms ($9.8 billion in 1989) than they spent on R&D ($7.9 billion in 
1919),  though, as the table indicates, there was extensive use of  both methods of  technology 
acquisition.  The survey distinguishes  two categories of R&D expenditure: R&D by affiliates for 4 
themselves, and R&D by affiliates for others (the latter of  which is R&D performed on a contract 
basis).  R&D by affiliates for  themselves constitutes roughly 80% of their total R&D expenditures. 
American firms spend a considerable amount of money on R&D performed in foreign 
countries, but in recent years, foreign-owned firms in the United States have spent even more than 
that on R&D  performed here.  Figure 1 illustrates the R&D expenditure levels of  foreign affiliates of 
U.S. firms and foreign-owned firms in the United States over the 1977-1990  period.  Due to the 
R&D-intensity of the  U.S. economy relative to the rest of the world, and the strength of foreign 
direct investment into the United States since 1973, foreign firms have spent more on R&D inside the 
United States than American firms have spent on R&D outside the United States in every year since 
1982, and the gap between the two expenditure levels is widening (see Figure  1)? 
There is considerable interest in the role of  multinational  firms in transferring 
technology across borders, and the impact that government policy can have on the rate and direction 
of technology transfer.  Though these issues have been extensively studied,4 one of the open 
questions is the degree to which imported technology is a substitute or complement for local R&D. 
US Taxation of  Foreign Income5 
3Exchange rate fluctuations can confound the interpretation  of  Figure  1, since changes in the value 
of  the dollar relative to foreign currencies affect the dollar-denominated  relative magnitudes of R&D 
performed in  the  United States  and abroad,  even if nominal  expenditures are  unchanged.  This 
consideration is not significant in this case, however, since a simple adjustment for the changing value 
of the dollar relative to a trade-weighted average of  foreign currencies produces a figure that  very closely 
resembles Figure 1. 
4See, for  example, Teece (1976), Germidis (1977), Mansfield, Teece, and Romeo (1979), Mansfield 
and Romeo (1980), Davidson and McFetridge (1984), Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Kravis  (1990), Zejan 
(1990), Blomstrom (1991), Ethier and Markusen (1991), Wang and Blonistrom (1992), and Blomstrom 
and Kokko (1993).  These studies together  consider the  effect of a  large number of variables on 
technology transfer and R&D activity, though they do not consider  the effect of royalty tax rates on local 
R&D intensities. 
5Parts of  this brief description of  the tax system are excerpted from Hines (1991). 5 
The United States taxes income on a "residence" basis, meaning that American 
corporations and individuals owe taxes to the U.S. government on all of their worldwide income, 
whether earned in the United States or  not.  The top U.S. corporate tax  rate is now 35 percent.  Since 
foreign profits are usually taxed  in host countries, U.S. law provides a foreign tax credit for income 
taxes (and related taxes) paid to foreign governments, in order not to subject American multinationals 
to double taxation. The foreign tax credit mechanism provides that an American corporation earning 
$100 in a foreign country with a 12 percent tax  rate (and  a foreign tax obligation of $12) pays only 
$23  to the U.S.  government, since its  U.S. corporate tax liability of $35  (35 percent of  $100) is 
reduced to $23 by the foreign tax credit of $12.  The foreign tax  credit is, however, limited to U.S. 
tax liability on foreign income; if, in the example, the foreign tax rate were 50 percent, then the firm 
pays $50 to the  foreign government but its U.S. foreign tax credit is  limited  to $35.  Hence an 
American firm receives full tax credits for its  foreign taxes paid only when it is in a "deficit credit" 
position, i.e., when  its  average foreign tax rate is less than its tax  rate on domestic operations.  A 
firm has "excess credits"  if its  available  foreign tax  credits exceed U.S. tax liability on its foreign 
income.  Firms average together their taxable incomes and taxes paid in all of their foreign operations 
in calculating their foreign tax credits and the foreign tax credit limit.6 
Deferral of U.S. taxation of  certain foreign earnings is another important feature of 
the U.S.  international tax system.  An American parent firm is taxed on its subsidiaries' foreign 
6ln order to qualify for the foreign tax  credit, firms must own at least 10% of a foreign affiliate, and 
only those taxes that qualify as income taxes are creditable. Furthermore, income is broken into different 
functional "baskets'  in the calculation of applicable  credits and limits.  Income earned and taxes paid in 
the conduct of most types of active foreign business operations are grouped in one "basket;" petroleum 
industry income  is grouped in a separate "basket;" and there are separate "baskets" for items such as 
passive income earned abroad.  The "basket" distinctions imply that a firns might simultaneously have 
excess foreign tax credits in the petroleum  "basket"  (which is common, since foreign tax rates on oil 
income are typically quite high) and deficit foreign tax credits in the active income "basket."  Such a firm 
would have to pay some U.S.  tax on its  active foreign income, even though it has excess foreign tax 
credits on its petroleum income. 6 
income  only when returned ('repatriated')  to the parent corporation.  This type of deferral is 
available only to foreign operations that are separately incorporated in foreign countries 
(subsidiaries"  of  the parent) and not to consolidated ("branch") operations.  The U.S. governnsent 
taxes branch profits as they are earned, just as it would profits earned within the United States. 
The deferral of U.S. taxation may create incentives for firms with lightly-taxed 
foreign earnings to delay repatriating dividends from their foreign subsidiaries.1 This incentive arises 
in those cases in which firms expect never to repatriate their foreign earnings, or if they anticipate 
that future years will be more attractive for repatriation (either because domestic tax rates will be 
lower, or because future sources of  foreign income will generate excess foreign tax  credits that can be 
used to offset U.S.  tax  liability on the dividends).S  It appears that, in practice, American 
multinationals tend to pay dividends out of  their more heavily taxed foreign earnings first.9 
Consequently, the average tax  rate that  firms face on their foreign income need  not exactly equal  the 
average foreign tax  rate faced  by their branches and subsidiaries abroad. 
Branch earnings and dividends from subsidiaries represent only two forms of  foreign 
income for U.S. income tax purposes. Interest received from foreign sources also  represents foreign 
income, though foreign interest receipts are often classified within their own 'basket"  and hence are 
7The incentive to defer repatriation of  lightly taxed subsidiary earnings is attenuated by the Subpart 
F provisions,  introduced in U.S.  law in  1962, that treat a subsidiary's passive income, and income 
invested in U.S.  property,  as  if it were distributed to its American owners, thereby subjecting it to 
immediate U.S. taxation. The Subpart F rules apply to controlled foreign corporations, which are foreign 
corporations owned at least 50% by American persons holding stakes of at least 10% each.  Controlled 
foreign corporations that  reinvest their foreign earnings in active businesses can continue to defer their 
U.S. tax liability on those  earnings.  See Hines (1994b), Hines and Rice (1994) and Scholes and Wolfson 
(1992) for the behavioral implications of  these rules. 
81t is interesting to note that the deferral of  US tax liability does not itself  create an incentive to delay 
paying dividends from foreign subsidiaries, since the US tax must be paid eventually.  See Hartman 
(1985). 
9See the evidence presented in Hines and Hubbard (1990). 7 
not averaged with other income in calculating the foreign tax credit.  Royalty income received from 
foreigners, including foreign affiliates of  U.S.  firms, is also foreign source income.  Foreign 
governments often impose moderate taxes on dividend, interest, and royalty payments from foreign 
affiliates  to their American parent companies; these withholding'°  taxes are fully creditable against 
an American taxpayer's U.S. tax liability on foreign income. 
The Tax Treatment of  R&D Expenditures and Royalty Rece(pts 
American multinational firms that  perform R&D in the United States intending to use 
the resulting technology both in the  United States and abroad face a complex tax treatment of  their 
transactions,  Since passage of  the Tax Reform Act of 1986, American multinationals are no longer 
allowed to deduct 100 percent of  their U.S. R&D expenses  against  their U.S.  tax liabilities.  Instead, 
U.S.  law requires American firms to allocate R&D expenses between U.S. and foreign source based 
on the fraction of a firm's sales that are foreign.1  The practical importance of  this system is that 
firms with excess foreign tax  credits receive usable tax deductions for only a fraction (equal to the 
ratio of domestic  sales to total worldwide sales)  of their U.S. R&D expenses.  This system is based 
on the ides that multinational  firms performing R&D in the United States use only a fraction of  the 
output of their R&D activities to enhance their sales in the United States, and consequently, that only 
a fraction of their R&D costs should be deductible against U.S-source  income. 
Royalties received by American parent firms for R&D used abroad represent taxable 
C)Taxes on cross-border flows, such as dividends, interest, and royalties, are known as 'withholding 
taxes due to  some of the specifics of their administration.  Strictly speaking, these taxes represent 
obligations of the recipients of the cross-border flows and not the payors; this arrangement permits 
immediate full crediting of withholding taxes by recipients who are eligible to claim foreign tax credits. 
The taxes are called "withholding' taxes because the local payor is the withholding  agent for the tax, and 
is therefore liable to its host government for full payment of the taxes. 
See Hines (1993, 1994a) for  descriptions of the precise formulas used and quantitative assessments 
of their impact on R&D spending levels. S 
foreign-source income of  the American firms.  American firms with deficit foreign tax credits must 
pay U.S. income tax on these royalty receipts, while firms with excess foreign tax credits can apply 
the excess credits against U.S. taxes due on the royalties, thereby eliminating the U.S.  tax  liability 
created by the royalty receipts. 
Most of  the world's governments impose withholding taxes on cross-border royalty 
payments from affiliates located within their countries.  These royalty tax rates are frequently reduced 
according to the terms of bilateral tax trestles.  For example, the United States imposes a 30 percent 
tax on royalties paid to foreign corporations, but this tax rate is often reduced, in some cases to zero, 
when recipients of royalty payments  are located in countries with whom the United States has a tax 
treaty in force. 
3.  Framework mr Analysis. 
This section analyzes the implications of systems of international taxation for the R&D 
behavior of multinational  firms. 
Consider a multinational  firm that establishes a foreign affiliate to produce and sell 
goods in the foreign country in which the affiliate is located.12  The affiliate generates sales using 
local  inputs of  capital, labor, and intermediate  products; in addition, the affiliate uses technology from 
its parent and the technology it generates on its own to produce goods for sale.  The reduced-form 
function that describes the impact of  technologies on the affiliate's sales can be formalized as: 
S(R, R*, ), in which S denotes sales in the local (foreign) market, R is technology provided by the 
parent firm to the affiliate in this market, R* is the technology that the affiliate generates on its  own, 
1-'This analysis abstracts from the possibility that the activities of  foreign affiliates directly enhance 
the sales of  its domestic parent firm.  One of  the practical difficulties that  American firms encounter in 
such situations  is  that  royalties paid  by  U.S.  parents  to  their  foreign  affiliates are severely tax- 
disadvantaged.  See Hines (1994a)  for a discussion of  this issue. 9 
and  denotes other features of the local market (as well as  the  affiliate's profit-maximizing 
employment of local factors). 
American tax  law and the tax  laws of most other countries'3  require that foreign 
affiliates pay rents or royalties to their parent firms for the fair market value of  technologies 
transferred from the parent firms to the affiliates.  Of course, in practice is it frequently difficult to 
establish the fair market value of  technology transferred from one party to another within a controlled 
group, since there may exist no market prices for the types of technology in question.  In such 
circumstances, tax-avoiding firms that transfer technology from the parent to its foreign affiliates 
often have incentives to select royalty payments  that transfer taxable income Out of high-tax 
jurisdictions and into low-tax jurisdictions.  Governments  are aware of  this incentive, and try to use 
their enforcement power to prevent royalties from deviating too greatly from reasonable values.'4 
One way to describe government enforcement efforts is to introduce an  additional cost 
that firms bear when royalties deviate from market values.  The cost includes the cost that firms incur 
in justifying their royalty delcarations to tax authorities. If  this adjustment cost rises sufficiently with 
the  size of the deviation of reported royalties from market values, then it will ultimately limit the 
degree to which firms modify royalty payments simply for tax purposes. 
A quadratic model of  adjustment costs provides a convenient framework to use in 
analyzing the impact of  government enforcement efforts.  One can distinguish R, the true value of 
transferred technology, from r, the royalty paid to the parent firm by the affiliate receiving the 
technology. If the rate of adjustment cost  is quadratic in the deviation of  declared royalties from the 
technology's market value, then adjustment costs equal a[(R-r)2/R2]  for each unit of  technology 
130f the twenty-five industrialized countries surveyed  by Lawlor (1985), twenty-four apply the arm's 
length principle to the taxation of related-party transactions; Hong Kong is the lone exception. 
'4For evidence on the overall effectiveness of  transfer price enforcement, see Kopits (1976), Grubert 
and Mutti (1991), Harris et al. (1993), and Hines and Rice (1994). 10 
transferred.  a is taken to be a constant parameter.  Total adjustment costs equal the product of  R and 
this term, or a(R-r)2/R. 
The affiliate's technology-related taxable income represents the difference between 
sales revenue generated by the technology and the affiliate's costs.  These costs include the affiliate's 
own R&D expenditures, the royalties it pays to the parent firm, and the adjustment cost.'5  The 
parent firm receives a royalty from its  affiliate, and may incur a cost of  producing the technology that 
it transfers to the affiliate.  In order to fix ideas for  the analysis that  follows, the model describes the 
behavior of  a multinational  firm that has excess foreign tax credits and that values on a one-for-one 
basis its after-tax profits in foreign subsidiaries.'6  The multinational  firm maximizes after-tax 
profits, iv: 
iv  =  (lr)[S(R, R*, )  - R* - r - n(R-r)21R]  +  (l_w*)r  -  cR  (1) 
"This treatment of the foreign affiliate abstracts from its activities that are unaffected by R&D 
activities or  technology imports. The affiliate, and not the parent firm, is assumed to bear  the adjustment 
cost because doing so simplifies the algebra that follows.  A  more general treatment  that  allocates 
adjustment  costs between affiliates  and parent firms yields qualitatively  similar results.  See, for  example, 
the treatment of  adjustment costs in Hines and Rice (1994). 
'6A finn values  its  subsidiaries'  profits  on  a one-for-basis either if there  is  no  tax  due upon 
repatriation or if the firm can use deferral strategies of  the type described in Hines and Rice (1994) to 
rednce the present value of repatriation taxes.  A firm with deficit foreign tax  credits maximizes an 
expression that is similar to (1), with the difference that the terms (l_r*) and (l_w*) are replaced by (i-a), 
in which r is the home-country  tax rate.  The first-order conditions  describing the behavior of such a firm 
imply that the firm sets r = R, and that, in this static setting, host-country tax rates do not  influence its 
behavior, in practice, the behavior of  American multinational  firms should reflect some kind of  average 
of these two extremes.  The analysis that follows assumes that all American firms have excess foreign 
tax credits, so, to the extent that many firms do not, the empirical estimates  understate the responsiveness 
of the affected  group to local tax conditions. The home countries of  foreign investors in the United States 
have tax systems that differ considerably in their treatments of R&D  expenditures and royalty and 
dividend income  from foreign sources.  The empirical work in this paper distinguishes  home-country tax 
systems only by whether firms are permitted to claim  foreign tax credits, which omits some more subtle 
distinctions and may, thereby, introduce measurement error in the tax variables. 11 
in which r  is the foreign statutory tax rate, w* is the withholding tax rate imposed by the foreign 
government on outgoing royalty payments, and c is the per-unit cost incurred by the parent firm to 
develop andlor transfer the technology represented by R.  The first  term in expression (1) represents 
the after-foreign-tax profits earned by the affiliate; the second term is the parent firm's  after- 
withholding-tax royatty receipts; and the third term is the parent firm's cost of developing the 
technology that it transfers to the affiliate.  tn some cases, parent firms costlessly  transfer to their 
subsidiaries technologies developed for other purposes, so it is possible that c = 0. 
The first-order condition describing the firm's  optimal choice of  r is: 
(1-rt)[2re(R-r)IR - 1]  + (l-w)  =  0  (2) 
which  yields: 
r  =  R{l + (r*w*)I[2a(tT*)I}  (3) 
The first-order condition describing the  firm's optimal choice of  R is: 
(lr*)[ôSIOR  - a(R-r)R+r)IR1  - c  =  0  4) 
Imposing  (3) and simpli1'ing yields: 
dSIÔR  =  cI(lr*) +  (w*_r*)I(l_r*)  -  (w*_r*)2/[4ci(l_r*)1  (5) 
The first-order condition describing the firm's  optimal choice of  R* is considerably simpler: 12 
asiar  =  1  (6) 
The conditions  (3), (5), and (6) characterize  the multinational  firm's optimal interior 
choices of  R, R*,  and r.  Inspection of (5) and (6) indicates that  taxation does not affect the required 
marginal productivity of R&D  performed in the foreign locatidn, while taxation does affect the 
required marginal productivity of R&D performed in the home country.  Consequently, as long as  tax 
rates are set in a manner that is exogenous to the unobservable  factors that  determine R&D intensity, 
it is possible to use the tax  variables that appear on the right side of  (5) to estimate the extent to 
which domestic technology is a substitute or complement  for foreign R&D. 
4.  Data. 
There are two available sources of detailed information on the R&D activities of 
multinational firms located in a large number of  countries.  The first source is the 1989 Benchmark 
Survey of the  Bureau of  Economic Analysis (BEA) of the United States Department of Commerce. 
This survey, the results of  which are reported in United States Department of Commerce (1992), is 
the most recent comprehensive survey of  the activities of  the foreign affiliates of American 
multinational firms.  The survey covers activities during 1989.  tn order to protect the confidentiality 
of survey respondents, BEA does not divulge the responses of individual firms, and reports country 
aggregates only for those countries in which there are sufficient numbers of  U.S.  firms with sizable 
activities that  aggregate figures do not reveal information about individual firms.  Useful R&D and 
royalty data are available for affiliates in 43 foreign countries for 1989. 
The second source of  information is the 1987 survey of  foreign direct investment in 
the United States, reported in United States Department of Commerce (1990).  This survey describes 
the activities of foreign-owned firms in the United States during 1987. Due to data suppressions and 13 
other limitations, useful data are available on investors  from 27 different countries during 1987, 
The goal of  the statistical work is to examine the relationship between royalty tax 
rates and levels of R&D  activity, both for American firms investing in foreign countries and for 
foreign firms investing in the United States.  The difficulty that  such a study encounters ia that R&D 
levels differ for reasons that have nothing to do with tax rates.  One nontax factor that is clearly 
associated with R&D spending is the degree of  R&D intensity in the countries in which multinational 
firms have operations.  The foteign affiliates of  American multinationals  located in countries whose 
economics  are R&D-intensive tend to perform more R&D than do affiliates located in other countries. 
Similarly, foreign-owned affiliates in the United States tend to invest more in R&D if their parent 
firms are located in technologically-intensive  countries.'7 
Information is available from the National Science Foundation (1991) on the R&D 
intensities of a large nsmber of countries.  The National Science Foundation constructs indices that 
reflect national R&DIGNP ratios; due to data limitations, these ratios are not  all calculated using data 
for the same year, though most observations represent the period 1986-1988."  In the empirical 
work that follows, the variables that influence  R&D demand are interacted with these country-level 
measures of R&D intensity.  This procedure represents a simple, if  rather unsubtie, adjustment for 
heterogeneity among countries in the extent to which their firms undertake R&D.  Local R&D 
'7At  a first pass, this association is suggestive of  a complementary  relationship between local R&D 
and imported  technology, since affiliates of  multinational  firms headquartered in R&D-intensive countries 
probably face lower real costs of importing technology than do affiliates of  fsrms from other countries. 
But differences in the technological  intensities of parent firms also reflect heterogeneity between affiliates 
that can invalidate such an inference. 
"R&DIGNP  ratios change  little from year to year, as evidenced by the time-series data on France, 
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States presented in Table 2.  These economies, 
which  are among  the most R&D-intensive  in the world, exhibit only gradual movements in R&D intensity 
relative so each other.  This pattern  suggests that time-invariant cross-sectional differences in R&D 
intensity are likely to be much more important than any differences crested by the asynchronous nature 
of the data reported by the National Science  Foundation. 14 
intensity can have an important impact on the demand for imported technology as well, so the R&D 
intenaity variable appears in the royalty equations. Since R&D intensity is likely to have less direct 
an impact on royalties than it does on R&D expenditures, the R&D intensity variable enters the 
royalty equations independently  of  the other explanatory  variables. 
Information on tax systems and tax rates is reported by Price Waterhouse (various 
isaues).  In the empirical work that  follows, firms are  assumed to face effective tax rates on their 
technology-related activities  equal to statutory corporate tax rates in host countries.  Tables 3 and 4 
report means and standard deviations of the variables used in the empirical work. 
5.  Foreign  Affiliates of  Asnerican Multinational  Cornorations, 
The model described by equations (fl-(6) carries the implication that  technology- 
related royalty payments and R&D spending levels should respond to local tax rates.  Specifically, the 
model predicts that  higher withholding  taxes on royalties will reduce royalty payments both by 
discouraging technology transfers, and by reducing the ratio of reported royalties to the valuet of 
technologies transferred. 
The regressions reported in Table 5 test these implications on the data that describe 
the behavior of  the foreign affiliates of American multinational  corporations for the year 1989.  Table 
5 presents estimates of the coefficients that correspond to the implied specification of the royalty 
demand equation that emerges from (3) and (5).  The dependent variable is a ratio, the numerator of 
which is royalties paid by the foreign affiliates of  U.S.  firms to their parent companies, and the 
denominator of which is total  sales by the affiliates.'9 Data represent country aggregates. 
'9The equations  reported in TableS were all re-run using total royalties pald in place of  royalties paid 
to U.S.  parents, with very similar results.  (And not  surprisingly, since, as Table 1 indicates, 80 percent 
of  all royalties paid by the foreign affiliates of American firms go to the  parent companies of  the affiliates 
paying the royalties.) The regressions reported in TableS use royalties paid to parent companies  because 
only for those royalties is it clear at what rate the royalties will be taxed. 15 
The estimates reported in column I of  Table 5 imply that royalty payments respond 
negatively to royalty tax rates and are close to unaffected by statutory tax rates.  The coefficients 
indicate that, at a statutory tax rate of  35 percent, a 10 percent reduction in the withholding tax rate 
on royalties stimulates additional royalty payments  equal to 0.1 percent of  sales.  The implied 
elasticity of  royalty payments with respect to the royalty tax rate, calculated using these estimates and 
mean values of  the variables as reported in Table 2, is approximately -O.4. If  sales are unaffected 
by changes in royalty tax rates, then this figure implies that doubling the royalty tax rate reduces 
royalties by 40 percent, a sizable fraction. 
Since sales may respond to tax rate changes, this calculation may understate the 
responsiveness  of royalties, but nevertheless strongly suggests that the true elasticity lies between zero 
and -1.  It is, however, important to note that the aggregate nature of the data may introduce 
considerable measurement error that biases the estimated  coefficient toward zero.  The sign of any 
bias introduced by omitted variables is ambiguous, though the magnitude could be large. 
The results presented in column 2 of Table 5 indicate that royalties also respond 
significantly  to differences between royalty withholding  tax rates and statutory tax rates.  As 
peedicted, the local R&D/GNP ratio is positively correlated with royalty payments.  Alternative 
specifications  reported in columns 3-5 of Table 5 yield similar conclusions:  high tax  rates on royalties 
are  associated  with lower ratios of royalty payments to total sales. 
The specifications  used to obtain the results described in Table 5 were changed in a 
number of  ways, in every case generating similar results.  One specification  issue concerns the 
appropriate choice of  denominator for the dependent variable.  Specifications in which labor 
compensation replaces sales as the denominator of  the dependent variable yield results that are almost 
Exercises  such as this one are fraught with dangers,  since variables may exhibit considerable 
differences between their conditional  and unconditional  means.  The calculation in the text is meant only 
to be illustrative. 16 
identical to those reported in Table 5.  Doe to the somewhat heterogeneous nature of  royalties, it 
seems most appropriate to scale this variable by sales.  In the regressions reported in Tables 6 and 9, 
the dependent variables that represent R&D expenditures are scaled by labor compensation in 
manofacturing for somewhat different reasons.  Manufacturing affiliates account for approximately 90 
percent of the R&D activity of foreign-owned affiliates in the U.S. and of the foreign affiliates of 
U.S.  firms.  Labor expenditures share with R&D expenditures  the feature of  immediate deductibility 
for tax purposes,2' and are more reasonably thooght of  as the prodoct of  firm choices than are sales, 
which may be functions of R&D.  All of the R&D  demand equations in reported in Tables 6 and 9 
were re-run acaling the dependent variable by labor expenditures, with results that are very similar to 
those reported in the tables. 
A Firsf Approach to Estimating the Impact of  Taxes on R&D 
The results reported in Table 5 indicate that royalty payments by the foreign affiliates 
of U.S. multinational firms respond to tax rates in the predicted manner.  The model described in 
equations (l)-(6) does not, however, carry a prediction about the sign of  the effect of  tax rates on 
R&D expenditure  levels, and the object of  the regressions reported in Tables 6 and 7 is to measure 
the sign of any effect that may be present.  The regressions reported in Tables 6 and 7 address this 
measurement problem using very different methodologies, though, as it happens, the results point to 
conclusions that are quite similar. 
Table 6 presents regressions that estimate of  the impact of the tax treatment of 
"Of course, some countries (including the United States) offer tax credits and other inducements to 
firms that perform R&D (and in some cases to firms that hire labor). A  brief survey of  country practices 
indicates, however, that sizable R&D subsidies are rare for example, see  Hall (1993) for  an analysis of 
the magnitude of the marginal subsidy provided R&D in the  United States  by  the Research  and 
Experimentation Tax Credit], and that the primary subsidy comes from the immediate deductibility of 
R&D expenses that  almost all industrialized countries provide. 17 
royalties on the  R&D-intensities of foreign affiliates of  U.S.  firms, using specifications drawn from 
the model described in equations (l)-(6).  The dependent variable is the ratio of  R&D expenditures in 
1989 to manufacturing labor compensation in 1989.  The results in the table are strongly suggestive 
of an important impact of royalty taxes on R&D activity, but not all of  the estimated coefficients in 
the table are significant.  The strongest and most parsimonious specification is presented in column 2 
of Table 6, and here the  estimated  coefficients suggest that an unfavorable tax climate for royalties is 
associated with greater R&D activity.  Imported technology and local R&D  appear to be substitutes. 
Columns  3-5 of Table 6 report the results of alternative specifications of  the modal. 
Two aspects of these results are noteworthy. The first is that the estimated coefficients on the 
variable [1/U .r*)  (R&D/GNP)] are always insignificant. This variable appears as one part of  the 
first term on the right side of (5), and the estimated  coefficient captures the effect of c, the cost of 
developing technology at home to transfer to affiliates  abroad.  The insignificance of  the estimated 
coefficient implies either that firms transfer nonrival technologies to their affiliates, so c = 0, or  that 
the cstimating mcthodology is not powerful enough to identify an important effect.  The second 
noteworthy aspect of the  results is that the specifications  that include quadratic tax terms generate 
insignificant results.  These results may reflect the limited ability of the estimators to distinguish the 
effects of collinear variables in a small  sample. 
Using the coefficient estimate from the equation presented in column I of Table 6, the 
implied elasticity of R&D activity with respect to the withholding  tax rate on royalties (evaluating all 
variables at their sample means) is approximately 0.16.  This figure is smaller than the implied 
royalty elasticity calculated from Table 5, which is reassuring, since own-price elasticities are usually 
stronger than cross-price elasticities. This estimated  elasticity suggests that local R&D is a mild 
substitute for imported technology, but it is helpful to consider additional evidence before drawing 
any conclusions. A Second Approach to Esthnating the Impact of  Taxes on R&D 
One of the  difficulties  that arise in estimating the impact of  royalty tax rates on local 
R&D levels is that many omitted variables influence  R&D spending.  It is possible that these variables 
are correlated with royalty withholding tax  rates in a way that biases the estimated tax rate 
coefficients, and generates a misleading conclusion  concerning the substitutability of  R&D for 
imported technology. The regressions reported in Table 6 control for local technological 
environments simply by interacting the tax variables with the (R&D/GNP) measure. 
An alternative approach is to use available information that distinguishes the R&D 
activity of  foreign affiliates of  American firms for their own purposes from R&D activity that they 
undertake on behalf of  others.  Both types of R&D  activity are likely to be influenced by local 
economic and technological conditions. It is, however, possible that the latter type of  contract-style 
R&D performed for others is generally unaffected  by the availability  of  technology imports from 
parent firms.  If not, then R&D performed for others serves as a control group with which to 
compare R&D performed by affiliates  for their own purposes.  Under the hypothesis that R&D 
performed for others is unaffected by technology imports, the fraction of  an affiliate's total R&D 
activity undertaken for itself  is a positive function of royalty taxes if  local R&D and imported 
technology are substitutes, and a negative function of royalty taxes if local R&D and imported 
technology are  complements. 
There are 38 countries in the sample for which the BEA data distinguish R&D 
performed by affiliates for themselves from R&D performed by affiliates for others.  Table 7 presents 
estimated coefficients from regressions in which the dependent variable is the ratio of  R&D performed 
by affsliates  for themselves to total R&D by affiliates.  The results once again suggest that local R&D 
is a substitute for imported technology.  In the regression reported in column 1 of Table 7, the 
estimated  coefficient on royalty withholding tax rates is positive and significant; the same is true of 19 
the coefficient on the  difference between  withholding and statutory tax rates reported in column 2. 
The coefficient estimates reported in colunm 2 indicate that a 10 percent change in the difference 
between foreign withholding and statutory tax  rates  (normalized  by one minus the foreign statutory 
tax rate) is associated with a 2.6 percent change in the intensity of R&D activity by affiliates for 
themselves. 
Columns 3-5 of Table 7 report the results of alternative specifications of the R&D 
demand equation. The coefficient estimates  from these specifications are consistent with those 
reported in columns 1-2, and are also consistent with the results reported in Table 6.  In particular, 
the estimated coefficient of  the variable lI(l-rt) is again insignificant. The estimates reported in 
column 1 of  Table imply that the elasticity of  R&D spending with respect to royalty withholding  taxes 
(evaluating  all variables at their sample means) is approximately 0.11, which resembles the elasticity 
calculated from estimates reported in Table 6. 
The regressions reported in Tables 6 and 7 offer consistent evidence that the aggregate 
behavior of  the foreign affiliates of  American multinational  firms exhibits substitution of local R&D 
for imported technology,  it is important to note, however, that there can be more than  one 
interpretation of  this pattern at the level of  individual firms.  One possibility is that tax differences 
influence the behavior of  firms located in different countries.  A second possibility is that  tax 
differences encourage specific firms to locate in certain countries and not in others, without 
influencing the R&D intensities of  individuatfirms.n  A third, and perhaps the most likely, 
possibility represents some combination of the first two.  The use of  aggregate data makes it 
impossible to use the observed pattern of  behavior to distinguish these explanations, though, for many 
purposes, it many not be necessary to distinguish them. 
Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Kravis (1990) examine the impact of  host-country characteristics on the 
attributes - particularly  R&D  intensitites - of  multinational  firms choosing to locate within the country. 
They do not, however, consider the impact of tax policies. 20 
6.  Foreign-Owned Affiliates in the United States 
The  behavior  of  foreign-owned affiliates in the United States offers additional 
evidence on the responsiveness of  R&D activity to royalty  tax rates.  This evidence must, however, 
be interpreted with caution,  owing to hetergeneous  circumstances of  foreign firms that invest in the 
United States and the small sample size of  27 foreign countries for wbich sufficient data are available. 
Home-country  tax treatments of foreign multinational  firms that invest in the United 
States differ according to individual  circumstances  and national law. There are two dimensions along 
which the variation  between investors is most important.  The  home governments of  some foreign 
investors tax the worldwide  incomes of their  residents while granting credits for foreign taxes paid, 
while other governments exempt all foreign-source income from tax.0  A second dimension along 
which tax systems differ concerns the degree of integration of personal and corporate taxes.  For 
some countries,  their corporation taxes largely  represent advanced withholding  taxes against personal 
tax liabilities. 
The specification of royalty  equations corresponding to the system described by (l)-(6) 
is somewhat different in the case of foreign  investors in the United States than it is in the regressions 
reported in Table 5.  To start, the tax rate r  is  the United  States tax rate, which  is the same for all 
foreign investors.  The value of c, the cost of producing technology for export,  need not be similar 
for different  foreign investors, and is captured in the estmating equations by  the inclusion of 
R&D/CINP  as an  explanatory variable.  And there may be important  differences between the 
incentives facing investors from foreign  tax credit countries and investors from countries that  do not 
grant foreign  tax credits. 
Table  S presents estimates of the determinants of  royalty payments by foreign-owned 
00f  course, this dichotomous breakdown greatly  oversimplifies  the many distinctions  and subtleties 
that foreign  tax systems exhibit. 21 
affiliates in the United States in 1987.  The coefficient on the withholding  tax rate in the regression 
presented in the column 2 of  Table 8 implies that raising the tax rate by 10 percent reduces the 
royalty/sales ratio by 0.74 percent.  The estimated coefficient lies just at the margin of  statistical 
significance.  To understand its magnitude in a different way, the implied elasticity of  royalties/sales, 
evaluating all variables at their  population means,  is approximately -0.12.  If sales are unaffected by 
cbanges in royalty tax rates, then this figure implies that doubling the royalty tax rate reduces 
royalties by 12 percent. 
Column 3 of Table 8 presents the same regression in which the withholding tax  rate is 
now transformed to be zero for all investors from foreign tax credit countries.  The results are very 
similar to those reported in column 2.  Columns 4 and 5 report results of  regressions in which 
squares of  the withholding tax rates are  introduced; the coefficient estimates are insignificant, 
reflecting the multicollinearity of the two tax rate variables and the limited amount of  variation in a 
sample of this size. 
Table 9 presents estimated coefficients  from regressions that investigate the correlation 
between the R&D intensity of foreign-owned affiliates in the United States and the tax variables that 
influence  the cost  of imported technology.  One striking feature of all of the regressions presented in 
Table 9 is the strong correlation between the R&D-intensity of foreign-owned affiliates in the United 
States and the R&D-intensity of  the countries in which their parent firms are located.  Column 2 
presents the simplest specification that includes  tax rate variables; the estimated coefficient on the 
interaction between the withholding tax rate and home-country  R&D intensity is positive and 
significant.  The implied elasticity of  R&D with respect to the cost of  imported technology (evaluated 
at sample means) is approximately  0.3.  This is a very sizable elasticity, particularly in view of  the 
smaller own-price elasticity of  royalties implied by the estimates reported in Table 8.  Furthermore, 
the reponsiveness of  royalties to withholding tax  rates  reflects changes in reporting behavior in 22 
addition to changes  in amounts of technology transferred.  The elasticity implies that, in the absence 
of an effect arising through the scale of operations, doubling the withholding tax rate raises R&D 
expenditures by 30 percent.  This estimated response magnitude is very large, and may reflect the 
imprecision of estimaces  drawn from so small  a sample.  Nevertheless, it is striking that the pattern of 
substitutability between R&D and imported technology appears for foreign investors in the United 
States as well as American investors in other countries?4 
Column 3 of Table 9 presents estimates from the specification in which the 
withholding tax  rate is interacted with a variable that equals zero if  the investor's parent company is 
located in a foreign tax credit country, and equals one otherwise.  The results are qualitatively very 
similar to those presented in column 2, with the difference that the estimated R&D appears in this 
specification  to be even more responsive to withholding  tax rates.  Columns 4 and 5 present 
regression results for specifications that include quadratic withholding tax rate terms, which again 
exhibit symptoms of multicollinesricy. 
Evidence on the behavior of foreign-owned affiliates in the United States suggests 
conclusions that are  very similar to those  that emerge from the behavior of the foreign affiliates of 
American corporations.  Foreign investors in the United States pay fewer royalties, and use more 
R&D-intensive operations, when facing higher tax rates on royalties paid to theft home countries. 
The restricted size of the sample of  investing foreign countries makes statistical inference difficult, but 
the estimated coefficients indicate a responsiveness  that is somewhat greater than that for the foreign 
affiliates of  American corporations. 
24Unfortunately,  BEA does not require foreign-owned firms in the United States to distinguish the 
R&D they perform for their own use from R&D that they perform for others, so it is not possible to 
estimate equations of  the type reported in Table 7 for foreign investors in the United States. 23 
7.  Conclusion. 
This paper uses information  on the behavior of the foreign affiliates of  U.S.  firms and 
foreign-owned affihiases in the United States to estimate the relationship between technology imports 
and local R&D.  The idea is to use the tax treatment of  royalty payments to identi& the degree of 
substitutability between these sources of  technology. Evidence from the actions of American and 
foreign firms indicates that R&D expenditures respond to local tax rates,  and that technology imports 
and local R&D are substitutes.  The substitutability  of  these two sources of technology carries 
numerous implications for the impact of  tax policy on R&D activity, particularly when contrasted 
with the complementarity that is sometimes thought to characterize their relationship. References 
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$  Billions 
4 
• inbound  Q  outbound 
Note: The vertical scale measures billions of  current dollars  of  annual R&D expenditures. 
Darkly shaded bars  represent  total R&D  expenditures  of foreign-owned  firms in the United 
States.  Lightly  shaded bars  represent  total R&D  expenditures  of foreign  affiliates of 
American  firms. 
Sources:  United States  Department  of Commerce,  Bureau of Economic Analysis, Foreign 
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Year Table 1 
R&D and Royalty  Activity of Foreign Affiliates of US Multinationals 
Year  1982  1989 
R&D expenditures, total  $ 3,851  $ 7,922 
R&D by affiliate for  its6if  3,073  6,307 
R&D byaffihiateforothers  778  1,615 
Royalty receipts, total  435  l,46t 
Receipts from US parents  36  54 
Receipts from other foreign affiliates  193  656 
Receipts from unaffihiated Americans  26  97 
Receipts from unaffihisted  foreigners  180  654 
Royalty payments, total  4,308  12,472 
Payments to US parents  3,663  9,839 
Payments to other foreign affiliates  354  1,488 
Payments to unaffiliated Americans  102  660 
Payments to unaffihiated  foreigners  189  485 
Note; Dollar amounts are millions of current dollars.  Dsta cover majority-owned foreign affiliates of 
US multinational  firms. 
Source; US Department of Commerce, Bureau of  Economic Analysis (1985, 1992). Table 2 
R&D Expenditure  as a Percentage  of GNP, 1961-1989 
West  United  United 
France  Germany  Japan  Kingdom  States 
-  1.4 
1.2  1.5 
1.4  1.5 
1.6  1.5 
1.7  1.6 
1.8  1.5 
2.0  1.6 
2.0  1.7 
1.8  1.7 
2.1  1.9 
2.2  1.9 
2.2  1.9 
2.1  2.0 
2.1  2.0 
2,2  2.0 
2.1  2.0 
2.1  2.0 
2.2  2.0 
2.4  2.1 
2.4  2.2 
2.5  2.3 
2.6  2.4 
2.6  2.6 
2.6  2.6 
2.8  2.8 
2.8  2.8 
2.9  2.8 
2.9  2.9 
2.9  3.0 
Source: National Science Board (1991). 
2.5  2.7 
-  2.7 
-  2.8 
2.3  2.9 
-  2.8 
2.3  2.8 
2.3  2.8 
2.2  2.8 
2.3  2.7 
-  2.6 
-  2.4 
2.1  2.4 
-  2.3 
-  2.2 
2.1  2.2 
-  2.2 
-  2.2 
2.2  2.1 
-  2.2 
-  2.3 
2.4  2.4 
-  2.5 
2.2  2.6  -  2.7 
2.3  2.8 
2.4  2.8 
2.3  2.8 
2.2  2.7 



























































Note: French data  are based on Gross Domestic Product (GDP); consequently, percentages may be 
slightly overstated compared to GNP.  Omissions (-) indicate  that R & D data are unavailable. Table 3 
Variable  Means and Standard Deviations, Foreign  Affiliates of  US Corporations, 1989 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  No. Obs. 
Parent Royalties/Sales  0.00774  0.00693  41 
R&D/Labor Compensation  0.05370  0.06317  43 
R&D for Affiliate/Total R&D  0.89466  0.16576  38 
R&DIGDP  0.01080  0.00878  41 
w*/(l.r*)  0.42149  0.54876  41 
r*/(1r*)  0.65270  0.29224  41 
(w*_r*)/(1_r*)  -0.23121  0.46387  41 
0.26339  0.27492  41 
1/(1r*)  1.65270  0.29224  41 
w'  0.20784  0.25274  38 
0.37666  0.09167  38 
[w*/(1r*)](R&D/GNP)  0.00263  0.00446  43 
[r*/(1r*)}('R&D/GNP)  0.0073  7  0.00797  43 
[(w*.T*)/(lr*)](R&D/GNP)  -0.00475  0.00752  43 
[(w*_r*)/(1_r*)jZ(R&D/GNP)  0.003  88  0.00641  43 
[1/(1r*)J(R&D/GNP)  0.01793  0.01602  43 
Note:  The regressions reported in Tables 5-7 use these variables.  The first three represent country- 
level aggregate activities of  foreign affiliates of  U.S. corporations in 1989, as reported in U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1992).  The variable (R&D/GNP) 
represents country R&D/GNP ratios reported by the National Science Foundation (1991).  The 
variable r  represents local statutory corporate tax rates, and w* represents withholding  tax rates 
imposed by foreign countries on royalty payments to the United States.  Observations are country- 
level aggregates of  the behavior of all U.S-owned  affiliates. Table 4 
Variable Means  and Standard Deviations, Foreign-Owned Affiliates in the United States,-1987 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  No. Ohs. 
Royalties/Sales  0.00759  0.00936  27 
R&D/Labor Compensation  0.08749  0.13590  27 
R&D/GNP  0.01511  0.00932  27 
w  0.12037  0.12805  27 
w(l-FTC)  0.06481  0.11752  27 
w2  0.03028  0.03998  27 
w2(1-FTC)  0.01750  0.03532  27 
w(T(&DIGNP)  0.00120  0.00190  27 
w(1-FTC)(R&D/GNP)  0.00068  0.00181  27 
w2(R&D/GNP)  0.00028  0.00056  27 
w2(1-VFC)(R&D/GNP)  0.00017  0.00054  27 
Note:  The regressions reported in Tables 8 and 9 use these variables.  The first  two variables 
represent country-level aggregate activities of  foreign-owned affiliates in the United States in 1987, as 
reported in U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1990).  The variable 
(R&D/GNP) represents country R&D/GNP ratios reported by the National Science Foundation 
(1991).  The variable w represents the withholding  tax rate imposed by the United States on royalty 
payments from the United States.  The variable FTC equals unity if an  investor's home country taxes 
worldwide income and grants foreign tax credits to its residents, and equals zero otherwise. 
Observations are country-level aggregates of the behavior of all U.S-owned  affiliates. Table 5 
Royalty Tax Rates and Royalty Payments  by Foreign Affiliates of U.S.  Corporations,  1989 
Dependent  Variable: (Royalties Paid to U.S. Parents/Total Sales), U.S-Owned  Affiliates 
Constant  0.0060  0.0014  0.0142  0.0016  0.0176 
(0.0027)  (0.0014)  (0.0067)  (0.0015)  (0.0078) 
R&D/GNP  0.4310  0.4023  0.4310  0.4310  0.4002 
(0.1201)  (0.1215)  (0.1201)  (0.1282)  (0.1240) 
-0.0068 
(0.0027) 
[r*/(lr*)]  -0.0013 
(0.0042) 
[(w*r*)/(1r*)]  -0.0061  -0.0068  -0.0063  -0.0066 
(0.0025)  (0.0027)  (0.0025)  (0.0027) 
[(w*_T*)I(1T*)]2  -0.0027  0.0039 
(0.0037)  (0.0046) 
[1I(1_r*)J  -0.0082  -0.0107 
(0.0042)  (0.0052) 
&  0.0053  0.0055  0.0053  0.0055  0.0052 
(0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0006) 
log L  125.0988  122.8083  125.0988  123.0681  125.4541 
n  41  41  41  41  41 
Note:  The columns report coefficients from Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
ratio of royalties paid by foreign affiliates of  U.S.  corporations  to their parent companies to the 
affiliates' total sales.  The variable (R&DIGNP) represents country R&D/GNP ratios reported by the 
National Science Foundation (1991).  The variable r  represents local statutory corporate tax rates, 
and w represents withholding  tax rates imposed by foreign countries on royalty payments to the 
United States.  Observations are country-level  aggregates of the behavior of all U.S-owned affiliates. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Table 6 
Local Tax Rates and R&D Intensities of Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Corporations,  1989 
Dependent Variable: Local (R&D/Manufacturing  Labor Compensation), U.S-Owned  Affiliates 
Constant  -0.0260  -0.0274  -0.0260  -0.0208  -0.0209 
(0.0146)  (0,0150)  (0.0146)  (0.0146)  (0.0147) 
R&D/GDP  10.0631  8.8330  12.7071  8.0861  8.5018 
(2.0237)  (1.8161)  (3.4801)  (1.7744)  (4.7042) 
[w*I(l_T*)].  3.1769 
(R&D/GNP)  (2.1870) 
[r*I(1_r*)I.  -5.8209 
(R&D/GNP)  (2.3508) 
[(w*_r)/(1r*)].  4.2941  3.1769  0.3143  0.3981 
(R&D/GNP)  (2.0724)  (2.1870)  (2.9011)  (3.0308) 
[(w*T*)I(lr*)]2.  -4.4628  .-42460 
(R&DIGNP)  (2.4171)  (3.3159) 
[1J(1r*)J.  -2.6440  -0.2590 
(R&D/GNP)  (2.0200)  (2.7136) 
&  0.0497  0.0509  0.0497  0.0487  0.0487 
(0.0062)  (0.0063)  (0.0062)  (0.0060)  (0.0060) 
logL  47.1507  46.3131  47.1507  47.9522  47.9568 
n  43  43  43  43  43 
Note: The  columns report  coefficients from Tobit regressions in which  the  dependent  variable  is the 
ratio of  R&D expenditures by foreign affiliates of U.S.  corporations to the affiliates' expenditures on 
labor compensation in manufacturing. The variable (R&D/GNP) represents country R&D/GNP ratios 
reported by the National Science Foundation (1991).  The variable r  represents local statutory 
corporate tax rates, and w represents withholding  tax rates imposed by foreign countries on royalty 
payments to the United States.  Observations are country-level aggregates of  the behavior of all U.S.- 
owned affiliates.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Table 7 
Local Tax Iate and the Own-Intensity  of R&D by Foreign  Affiliat  of  U.S. Corporations, 1989 
Dependent Variable: (R&D by Affiliates for Affiliates/Total R&D by Affiliates) 
Constant  0.9644  0.9294  0.9750  0.9447  0.8776 
(0.1273)  (0.0685)  (0.3068)  (0.2065)  (0.4103) 
w*I(1T*)  0.2654 
(0.1333) 
7*1(1_Tx)  -0.2048 
(0.2028) 
(w*r*)I(1*)  0.2562  0.2654  0.2362 
(0.1256)  (0.1333)  (0.1509) 





(0.  2982) 
1I(1r*)  0.0606  0.1311 
(0.1923)  (0.2766) 
0.2527  0.2527  0.2527  0.2550  0.2525 
(0.0435)  (0.0434)  (0.0435)  (0.0439)  (0.0434) 
log L  -12.1006  -12.1524  -12.1006  -12.5287  -12.0370 
n  38  38  38  38  38 
Note:  The columns report coefficients from Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
ratio of R&D expenditures by foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations for their own use to the 
affiliates' total R&D expenditures.  The variable r  represents local statutory corporate tax rates, and 
represents withholding  tax rates imposed by foreign countries on royalty payments to the United 
States.  Observations are country-level aggregates of  the behavior of all U.S.-owned affiliates. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Table  8 
Royalty Tax Rates and Royalty Payments  by Foreign-Owned Affiliates in the United States,  1987 
Dependent Variable: (Royalties  Paid/Total Sales), Foreign-Owned Affiliates 
Constant  -0.0012  0.0005  -0.0004  0.0007  -0.0003 
(0.0008)  (0.0011)  (0.0008)  (0.0011)  (0.0008) 
R&D/GNP  0.1100  0.0541  0.0834  0.0529  0.0831 
(0.0432)  (0.0471)  (0.0418)  (0.0458)  (0.0413) 
w  -0.0074  -0.0174 
(0.0036)  (0.0116) 
w(1-FTC)  -0.0073  -0.0151 
(0.0038)  (0.01  87) 
w  0.0342 
(0.0375) 
w2(1-FTC)  .  0.0269 
(0.0630) 
0.0018  0.0016  0.0016  0.0016  0.0016 
(0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
logL  77.1371  79.3389  79.1162  79.7464  79.2077 
n  27  27  27  27  27 
Note:  The columns report coefficients from Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
ratio of royalties paid by foreign-owned affiliates to the affiliates' total U.S. sales in 1987.  The 
variable (R&DIGNP) represents country R&DIGNP ratios reported by the National Science 
Foundation (1991).  The variable w represents the withholding tax  rate imposed by the United States 
on royalty payments from the United States.  The variable FTC equals unity if an investor's home 
country taxes worldwide income  and grants foreign tax credits to its residents, and equals zero 
otherwise.  Observations are country-level aggregates of  the behavior of all foreign-owned affiliates. 
Standard errors are  in parentheses. Table 9 
Royalty Tax Rates and R&D Intensities  of  Foreign-Owned Affiliates in the United States, 1987 
Dependent Variable: (R&D/Manufacturing  Labor Compensation),  Foreign-Owned Affiliates 
Constant  -0.1844  -0.1716  -0.1345  -0.1625  -0.1387 
(0.0697)  (0.0565)  (0.0456)  (0.0547)  (0.0472) 
R&D/GNP  14.6146  12.1191  10.5524  12.2114  10.6242 
(3.5479)  (2.9640)  (2.3883)  (2.8594)  (2.4134) 
w(R&D/GNP)  30.8403  -5.6039 
(11.9140)  (42.1940) 
w(1-FTC).  45.4557  72.9530 
(R&D/GNP)  (10.0257)  (63.4897) 
w2(R&D/GNP)  128.6451 
(142  .4354) 
w2(1-FTC)'  -93.2700 
(R&D/GNP)  (212.7782) 
0.1335  0.1094  0.0891  0.1060  0.0892 
(0.0225)  (0.0190)  (0.0153)  (0.0185)  (0.0154) 
logL  6.7117  9.2883  13.0824  9.6807  13.1794 
n  27  27  27  27  27 
Note:  The columns report coefficients from Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
ratio of  the U.S.  R&D expenditures of  foreign-owned affiliates to the affiliates' total US. 
manufacturing labor compensation in 1987.  The variable (R&DJGNIP) represents country R&DJGNP 
ratios reported by the National Science Foundation (1991).  The variable w represents the withholding 
tax rate imposed by the United States on royalty payments from the United States.  The variable FTC 
equals unity if  an investor's home country taxes worldwide income and grants foreign tax credits to 
its  residents, and equals zero otherwise.  Observations are country-level aggregates of the behavior of 
all foreign-owned affiliates.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 